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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2285
CARRINGTON KEYS,
                                               Appellant
   v.
C.O. CRAIG; SUPERINTENDENT ZIMMERMAN; LIEUTENANT RHODES, Sgt.;
WOLARD; C.O. WITTEL; C.O. I ALBA; JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of D.O.C.;
SERGEANT WEBB; ROBERT BILOUS; DONALD KELCHNER;
GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR JAGGERT
_____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-01004)
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 18, 2005
Before:   ROTH, BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 7, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Carrington Keys appeals from a District Court order dismissing his
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
Because no substantial question is presented, we will affirm.  See L.A.R. 27.4.
       We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over1
the dismissal of a complaint for failure to exhaust.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
226 (3d Cir. 2004).  Keys also brought suit against several other prison officials, each of
whom the District Court dismissed in earlier orders.  Keys does not appeal these
dismissals.  Thus, we address the claims and parties dismissed on April 8, 2005, only.
2
On May 6, 2004, Keys filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First and
Eighth Amendment violations against numerous prison officials.  He filed his first
amended complaint on May 19, 2004, raising the same claims, but with added details.  At
issue in this appeal is the dismissal of Keys’ claims against Correctional Officers Craig,
Zimmerman, Wittel, Alba, and Webb.  Keys alleges each denied him food, religious
material, and legal material in retaliation for his testimony in another inmate’s court
proceedings.  On April 8, 2005, adopting a Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation, the District Court dismissed the complaint because it held Keys failed
to properly exhaust his available administrative remedies.  Keys appeals.1
An inmate must properly exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to
filing suit under § 1983.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524
(2002); Spruill, 372 F.3d at 222.  In Spruill we held that proper exhaustion means that
inmates must follow the procedural requirements of the prison grievance system.  Spruill,
372 F.3d at 231.  If an inmate fails to follow the prison grievance policy, then his claims
are procedurally defaulted.
The Commonwealth’s grievance policy provides three levels of review.  See DC-
ADM 804, Part VI.  The District Court found Keys failed to satisfy the final stage of
       Keys filed his initial grievance, Grievance No. 82727, with respect to the deprivation2
of food claims only.  His legal and religious material deprivation claims are defaulted.
       In Spruill, we left unresolved at what point compliance with prison grievance3
procedures is deemed sufficiently “substantial” to excuse procedural default.  Spruill, 373
F.3d at 232 (citing Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 77-78 (3d Cir. 2000)).  To the extent that
Keys raises this issue, the instant facts do not require us to decisively resolve the question. 
Instead, it suffices to state that Keys’ failure to even attempt compliance with the
grievance procedures cannot be sufficiently substantial to act as an excuse.  Otherwise,
few, if any, single procedural failures would establish a default.
3
review.  “An inmate who is dissatisfied with the disposition of an appeal from the Facility
Manager, may submit an appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and
Appeals, [hereinafter SOIGA] . . . .”  DC-ADM 804, Part VI.D.1.b.  On May 24, 2004,
Keys timely filed an appeal, but failed to attach documents required for “a proper appeal
to final review.”  DC-ADM 804, Part VI.D.1.h.     The SOIGA refused to act on the2
appeal because of this deficiency.  
Keys argued in the District Court that he did eventually submit the documents
required for proper review, but he was delayed because the prison took two weeks to
make copies.  However, Keys never submitted the documents to the SOIGA, nor did he
request an extension of time to file them.  Rather, he forwarded the documents along with
a letter explaining his situation to Jeffrey Beard, the DOC Secretary.  It is also evident
that Keys was aware of the filing requirements, but still failed to adhere to the grievance
policy.   Keys’ claims are thus procedurally defaulted.  Accordingly, because no3
substantial question is presented, the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint will
be affirmed.
